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A dynamic model is developed to analyze the reintroduction of endangered predators. Non-
convexities and the conditions under which reintroduction is sub-optimal are studied.
Following reintroduction, costly population control should be initiated before marginal
animals impose net costs, providing an economic interpretation to changes in the sign of the
shadow price.
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The reintroduction of locally extirpated species and the supplementation of threatened
populations are increasingly relied upon in efforts to ensure the continued existence of
animals in danger of extinction.  While they provide nonconsumptive benefits, population
recovery plans are controversial when they involve the return of predators.  Strong opposition
to the reintroduction of  wolves to Yellowstone, the southwestern United States, the
Adirondacks and Maine (Stevens, 1997); and of Grizzlies to Idaho (MacCracken et al., 1994)
are testimony to the fears of local populations, and the danger posed by predators.  Coyotes,
cougars and bobcats cause losses of livestock estimated at $65 million per year (GAO, 1995).
Alligator, coyotes and mountain lions occasionally attack and kill humans and the number
of such attacks is on the rise (Kenworthy, 1997).  In Florida, authorities receive 15,000 calls
annually from residents requesting the removal of Alligators (Kenworthy, 1997). 
While society may benefit from the protection of endangered predators, reestablishing
self-sustaining populations implies the potential for population growth and increased conflict
with humans.  Yet, the intertemporal analysis of costs and benefits from wildlife with the
potential to harm humans is notably absent from the literature. 
In this paper, an optimal control model of wildlife management is constructed to
analyze the characteristics of efficient population recovery and control programs.  The model
is designed to accommodate management strategies ranging from reintroduction to costly
population control of a species for which additional animals may be either desirable or
undesirable.  After a presentation of the model, I explore the characteristics of the dynamical2
system.  Because of the predator’s potential to harm as well as benefit society, the shadow
price of the population is allowed to be either positive or negative, creating multiple
equilibria which are studied in order to determine the optimal solution to the model.  The
conditions under which species reintroduction is uneconomical and the properties of optimal
wildlife management plans are then discussed.  Concluding remarks summarize the findings.
1. Model Essentials
The objective of a benevolent wildlife manager is to choose a sequence of  harvesting






















where the time index, t, has been suppressed from X and Y for convenience.  
￿  is the
discount rate, X is the population of a predator species expressed as a proportion of carrying
capacity, and Y is the rate of harvesting where Ymin 
￿  Y(t)
￿  Ymax;  Ymin <0,  Ymax>0.  A
negative harvest rate indicates supplementation of the population. Throughout, it is  assumed
that Ymax is sufficiently large to be economically irrelevant. V(X) and D(X) are increasing and
respectively strictly concave and strictly convex functions measuring the rates of
nonconsumptive benefits and damage to society when the population level is X.  N(Y) is a
strictly concave and single-peaked function indicating the net benefits from harvesting
wildlife at rate Y. The maximum of this function is Y
￿




￿ )=0, and Ny<0 for Y>Y
￿
.  For Y<0, N(Y) represents the cost of supplementation,3
which, given our assumptions, is increasing at an increasing rate (in negative Y).  The taking
of animals beyond Y
￿  would never be part of the solution in a standard harvesting model but
must be entertained here since a large stock can have detrimental effects on welfare.
Harvesting rates above Y




￿ )=0} as the (unique) population level at which the damage caused by an
additional unit of the stock equals the nonconsumptive benefits received from it. The law of





F(X), has F(0)=F(1)=0 and F(X)>0 for 0<X<1.
2. Necessary Conditions and Phase Space
We show elsewhere (Rondeau, 1997) that a solution to (P) exists.  Forming the
current value Hamiltonian and the Lagrangean ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
￿
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as well as by the slackness conditions 
￿ (Y-Ymin)=0, 
￿
￿ 0.  Since we allow the net benefits
from a marginal unit of the stock and the marginal return on harvesting to be either positive
or negative, the sign of the costate variable µ is not restricted.  It is therefore possible for the
Lagrangean to be non-concave and (1) to (5) are not sufficient for a maximum (Kamien and
Schwartz, 1991). Combining (1) with the slackness condition, we obtain that Y=Ymin if4
1  All simulations use V(X) = p(1-e
-aX); D(X)=cX
g; N(Y) = bY-zY
2; and 
F(X)=rX(1-X). Constants are positive. Systems simulated using Mathematica 3.01.
Ny(Ymin)<µ and Y=Y* if Ny(Y*)=µ (1').  Note from 1' that harvesting beyond profitability
will be optimal whenever the costate variable is negative. 
The dynamical system of this problem in the X-Y space is given by equations (3) and
(after manipulation of equations 1 and 2)  ( ) [ ]
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Figure 1 presents topologies of this system for which an interior steady state solution
exists.
1  The  isocline is represented by the dome shaped curve while all other dotted
!
X=0
curves represent the  isocline for different parameterizations of the system.
!
Y=0
The number and variety of admissible representations is of limited relevance to policy
design since many of the topologies share common types of steady states and stability
properties.  It is shown in Rondeau (1997) that if parameter values result in a unique interior
steady state (panels D, F, G, and H ), the long term equilibrium is a saddle point.   In this
context, the optimal policy is to follow a unique manifold leading to the steady state.  On the
other hand, when a diagram has three equilibria, a central unstable node or spiral is
outflanked by two saddle points.  These topologies are more challenging to analyze but richer
in economic interpretation and we focus on them for the remainder of the paper.
3. Competing Trajectories and Multiple Equilibria: Choosing the Right Path
For a study of systems with multiple equilibria, it is useful to consider Figure 2 which
is a complete diagram of Figure 1C (X
"  >X
# ), as well as Figures 3 and 4 which elaborate on
Figure 1A (X
" <X
# ).  In all cases, the pair (X
" ,Y
" ) is interior to F(X) indicating not only that a
marginal animal can be undesirable, but also that the profit maximizing rate of harvesting5







3.1 Globally Optimal Solution When a Single Spiral Leads to a Saddle Point
Inspection of Figures 2 and 3 reveals that from any initial condition X0 
% [0,Xsup] it
is possible to adopt harvesting plans leading to either X1
&  or  X3
& .  Adapting some of the
methods introduced by Davidson and Harris (1981) and Tahvonen and Salo (1996) we make
use of the properties of the maximized Hamiltonian to identify the globally optimal solution.
From our assumptions on V(X), D(X), N(Y), and F(X) and by (1') to (3), it holds piecewise
continuously that:
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The last term is equal to zero in all periods.   Integrating both sides and dividing by 
)  yields
( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) [ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]
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This equation simply states that on trajectories leading to a steady state, the net
present value of a wildlife management program is equal to receiving, at every instant and
forever, the value given by the Hamiltonian for the initial stock and harvesting levels.  
Define, M(X0 ,Y0)=(1/
* ){V(X0)- D(X0)+N(Y0)+[NY(Y0)+
+ ][F(X0)-Y0]}, set 
, =0 (for an
interior path) and take the partial derivative with respect to Y0.  The result indicates the effect
of increasing the initial rate of harvesting on the net present value of a program leading to







. =0 for Y0=F(X0) (6)
>0 for Y0>F(X0) 6
For a given initial stock level X0, the value of an optimal management program is decreasing
in Y if Y0<F(X0) and increasing if Y0>F(X0).  This result establishes that when more than one
adjustment paths can be chosen in systems such as those in Figures 2 and 3, the lower
trajectories leading to X3
/  are globally optimal.
3.2 Globally Optimal Solution When Two Spirals Lead to Separate Saddle Points 
In the topology of Figure 4, either saddle point can be reached from initial stock
levels in the vicinity of (X2
/ ,Y2
/ ).  In addition, on trajectories leading to either steady state
multiple candidate initial harvesting levels define several alternative time paths.  To find the
globally optimal trajectory, define Xsup as the largest stock level on the path leading to
(X1
/ ,Y1
/ ) (call it “path 1").  It can be shown that none of the candidates before Xsup on path
1 can be optimal initial harvesting levels. The argument relies first on (6), from which we
establish that trajectories starting on the outer portion of any given spiral are superior to those
starting in the interior; and second, on the fact that the change in the value of the maximized
Hamiltonian resulting from a change in X0 along a trajectory is given by dM(X0,Y0)/dX0 =
Ny(Y0)<0. The sign of this derivative is negative since it can be shown that path 1 lies
entirely above Y
0
.  With Nyy<0, the value of a management program decreases at a slower rate
as one moves the initial population and harvesting levels along the lower portion of path 1,
than it increases on the portion of the path above F(X).  As a result, any program beginning
before (Xsup, Ysup) on path 1 is dominated by the alternative sequence beginning after it.  With
a parallel argument, we find that any management plan beginning before (Xinf, Yinf) is inferior
to a program beginning after it.    7
Determining the globally optimal solution still requires choosing which of path 1 or
3 maximizes welfare for initial stocks between Xinf and Xsup.  Suppose that the initial stock
level is Xinf. By (6), we conclude that the path with the highest initial harvesting level is
optimal.  On the other hand, if the initial stock is Xsup the path with the smallest initial
harvesting is preferred.  Since from Xinf  it is optimal to take the high path toward (X1
1 ,Y1
1 )
and from Xsup it is optimal to take the lower path to (X3
1 ,Y3
1 ), there exists a critical stock
located between Xinf and Xsup, below which it is optimal to adopt path 1 and above which
path 3 is preferred. The system represented by Figure 4 has therefore two basins of attraction.
4. Properties of Optimal Population Recovery and Control Programs
Reintroduction and Supplementation. Under certain conditions preventing the
existence of interior steady states, it is not beneficial to reintroduce a predator to its former
habitat.  From the expressions defining the dynamical system, a steady state population  must
solve [
2 -Fx(X)]=[Vx(X)-Dx(X)]/N’(F(X)).  Since F(
3 ) is continuous and single peaked with
F(0)=F(1)=0, the marginal benefits from harvesting can only take a limited range of values
in the interval [Ny(F(0)), Ny(F(Xmsy))].  If 1) F(Xmsy)<Y
4
; 2) the marginal net non-consumptive
benefits of the first animal, Vx(0)-Dx(0), are sufficiently small (or negative); and 3) the
discount rate is greater than the marginal growth rate of the first unit of the stock [
5 >Fx(0)]
then, no interior steady state exists.  Since the cost of reintroducing the first animal is always
greater than the benefits from harvesting it, these conditions ensure that it will never be8
2  By assumption, N(
6 ) is continuous at Y=0 with Ny(0)>0 and Nyy(0)<0.  This
ensures that the marginal cost of reintroducing the first (pair of) animal(s) is larger then
the marginal benefits from harvesting the first unit. Empirical observations support this
observation.  The average cost of a U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s recovery plan
exceeds $3 million (1994).  The ten most expensive programs cost between $29 and $88
million.  Species recovery also imposes indirect costs such as restrictions on forestry.
beneficial to reintroduce the species.
2  These conditions are naturally related to the conditions
under which it is optimal to harvest a species to extinction in conventional harvesting models
as found by Clark (1973), Cropper et al. (1979) and Cropper (1988).
Conservation, Harvesting and Pest Control.  In the situations illustrated in Figures
2 to 4, the reintroduction and supplementation of a population of predators is optimal.  The
initial supplementation phase driven by high marginal non-consumptive benefits is followed
by an instant of conservation “during” which the population is self-regulated.  As the
population increases naturally, the optimally managed population would be removed from
the list of protected species and become the subject of harvesting, albeit at sufficiently low
levels to allow continued population growth.  From then on, society will benefit from the
consumption of animal products as well as from and the amenity value of the stock.
However, regardless of the steady state population the species is ultimately headed for, the
fact that the equilibrium harvesting rate is above Y
7  implies that pest control activities will
become inevitable.
Costly population control would start before X reaches the level X
7  at which an
additional animal is considered a nuisance (see Rondeau for a proof). This result has intuitive
appeal. As the stock increases, the net present value of future losses associated with a9
marginal animal grows and eventually causes the shadow price to go from positive to
negative.  By equation (1), this change in the sign µ corresponds precisely to the instant at
which  it becomes optimal to incur net harvesting costs to control the population’s rate of
growth. At that instant marginal animals would still yield positive instantaneous net benefits.
Nonetheless, the prospect of their “offsprings” inflicting future damage makes it optimal to
restrict growth, even at a cost to society.  Once the shadow price has signaled the beginning
of pest control, society will incur control costs forever in order to lower the growth rate and
limit the damage inflicted by the population.
   Earlier efforts to boost natural productivity may then be seen as foolish and unfair.
But it should not be so.  Additional inspection of the conditions maximizing the value of a
program along the optimal path reveals that the instant when the shadow price changes from
positive to negative coincides precisely to the time when the present value of the forward
portion of the control program is maximized.  That is, dM(X0,Y0)/dX0=Ny(Y0), and setting
this expression to zero and using 1' implies Ny(Y
8
)=0=µ. 
Thus, the intergenerational distribution of costs and benefits is likely to be unequal
and hinder the timely implementation of optimal management decisions. Current generations
may not want to pay the high cost of reintroduction and supplementation, resulting in
extinction or sub-optimal conservation efforts.  If the species subsists, following generations
enjoying the non-consumptive benefits of a recovering population may not wish to curb its
growth, leaving more distant generations with a larger than optimal population that imposes
high damage rates and requires costly control. Unfortunately, there is little room for errors
given the unstable properties of the system and the absence of self-correcting mechanisms.10
Final Remarks  
The model of predator management developed in this paper differs substantially from
conventional models of renewable resources.  It allows species reintroduction and other 
enhancement programs, conflicts between animals and humans, and the possibility of
profitable harvesting as well as costly pest control. Yet, typical solutions have emerged
where a single optimal trajectory leads to a saddle point steady state.  In addition, the
conditions under which reintroduction should not take place are extensions of the conditions
leading to optimal extinction in those conventional resource harvesting models.
Less orthodox solutions have also emerged where a change in the sign of the shadow
price makes the Hamiltonian non-concave.  In these cases, the optimal management plan is
only one of several possible equilibrium paths.  When the reintroduction and
supplementation of endangered predators are beneficial, the optimal policy is one of
controlled but rapid initial population increase.  Notwithstanding this initial prescription, the
model also calls for active population control well before the animal reaches its nuisance
level.  This policy is justified by the costs that large future populations of predators may
impose.  Its timing corresponds precisely to a change in the sign of the shadow price.
  The analysis underscores the importance of long term planning for the optimal
management of predators.  The results likely extend to other species such as the white-tailed
deer, bison, or fox that carry diseases or can cause injury to humans.  The model offers a test-
bench for case studies of the management of such populations. Nonetheless, the analysis
leaves unresolved the daunting questions raised by distributional inequities and the political
challenges they pose for the timely implementation of efficient management policies.11
Figure 1.  Topologies and Bifurcations
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